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ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
JUDICIAL REvIEW UNDER NEPA
Introduction
In 1965, the Second Circuit's opinion in Scenic Hudson Preserva-
tion Conference v. Federal Power Commission (FPC)1 presaged an
environmental awakening. The court and its decision represented the
bright hopes of newly combative conservationists.
When Scenic Hudson returned to the Second Circuit this year,
there were many who anticipated that it would again break ground,
this time in interpreting the provisions of the National Environmental
Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA).2 However, as this Note will demonstrate,
when Scenic Hudson was finally laid to rest, many optimistic expecta-
tions of environmentalists went with it.
During the seven years that the case was in the courts, environ-
mental legislation and litigation greatly increased and expanded.
Indeed, Scenic Hudson I was largely responsible for this increase by
recognizing environmental groups as "aggrieved parties" with stand-
ing to sue8 and by construing section 10(a) of the Federal Power Act4
as mandating consideration of ecological factors in the FPC's decision-
making process.
The adoption of NEPA between the Second Circuit's two en-
counters with Scenic Hudson was a development influenced at least
in part by that decision5 and was also to significantly affect the final
outcome of the case. Hailed by some as the most important piece of
environmental legislation to date and as "an environmental 'bill of
rights,' " NEPA recognizes as a national concern the attainment of
"the widest range of beneficial uses of the environment without...
undesirable... consequence,"7 and the need to "preserve important
1354 F.2d 608 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied 384 U.S. 941 (1966); 453 F.2d 463 (2d Cir.
1971), cert. denied, 40 U.S.L.W. 3599 (U.S. June 19, 1972).
2 42 U.S.C. § 4321 et seq. (1970).
3 Scenic Hudson I recognized that "aggrieved parties" under § 313(b) of the Federal
Power Act included those who have shown a special interest in "aesthetic, conservational,
and recreational aspects of power development." 354 F.2d at 615-16. But see Sierra Club
v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972) (discussed in note 100 infra). See generally Hanks 8: Hanks,
An Environmental Bill of Rights: The Citizen Suit and the National Environmental
Policy Act of 1969, 24 RuTGnas L REv. 234, 245 (1970) [hereinafter Hanks].
4 Federal Power Act (FPA) § 10(a), 16 U.S.C. § 803(a) (1970).
5"In a very real sense this Act is a legislative response to and embodiment of the
far-sighted and significant Scenic Hudson decision of this court..." 453 F.2d at 491-92
(1971) (dissenting opinion).
6 Hanks, supra note 3, at 230; see note 93 infra.
742 U.S.C. § 4332(b)(3) (1970).
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historic, cultural, and natural aspects of our national heritage."8 It
further directs, as a means to effectuate this end, that all federal agen-
cies, "to the fullest extent possible,"9 follow the policies set forth in
the Act and include, along with every report or recommendation
"significantly affecting the quality of the human environment"10 an
environmental impact statement. Such statement is to include:
(i) the environmental impact of the proposed action,
(ii) any adverse environmental effects which cannot be avoided
should the proposal be implemented,
(iii) alternatives to the proposed action,
(iv) the relationship between local short-term uses of man's en-
vironment and the maintenance and enhancement of long-
term productivity, and
(v) any irreversible and irretrievable commitments of resources
which would be involved in the proposed action should it be
implemented.1
8 Id. § 4331(b)(4).
9 42 U.S.C. § 4332. The Conference Report on NEPA, H.R. REP. No. 91-765, 91st
Cong., Ist Sess. 9010 (1969), indicated that the phrase "to the fullest extent possible" was
to apply to the specific mandates of section 102 (i.e., the preparation of an impact state-
ment), as well as to the general statement of intent set forth in section 101. In addition,
the severely limiting phrase "nothing in this act shall increase, decrease, or change any
responsibility or authority of any Federal office or agency created by other provisions
of law" was deleted by the House conferees. This was to assure compliance with NEPA
even where an agency might have a pre-existing duty to give some consideration to
environmental factors in the course of its decision-making. That is, absent express agency
provisions to the contrary, other agency directives "shall not be used by any Federal agency
as a means of avoiding compliance with the directives set out in section 102." In addition,
the hearings on S. 1075, S. REP. No. 91-296, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 13-14 (1969), indicate the
desire to grant new authority to federal agencies having no current responsibility for
protecting the environment. See Environmental Quality-The Third Annual Report of
the Council on Environmental Quality 224-25 (1972) [hereinafter CEQ THnn ANNUAL RE-
PORT]; Hanks, supra note 3, and notes therein for comments and criticisms of this legislative
history; see note 22 and accompanying text infra.
1o42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (1970).
3 Id. For salutory effects of the NEPA on prior and subsequent water pollution
legislation see Barry, The Evolution of the Enforcement Provisions of the Federal Water
Pollution Control Act: A Study of the Difficulty in Developing Effective Legislation, 68
Maic. L. REv. 1103, 1125-26 (1970). For a comparison of the NEPA with other recent
legislation see 0. GRAY, CASES AND MATERIALS ON ENVIRONMENTA- LAw 9 (1970). For inter-
national ramifications of NEPA see CEQ Tana ANNUAL REPORT at 258. Additional legis-
lation was enacted and guidelines were published in succeeding years to implement NEPA.
The Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ) was created to oversee administration of
NEPA. National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, Pub. L. 91-190, §§ 202-06, 83 Stat. 854-
56. It subsequently published guidelines in 1970 for following § 102 procedural require-
ments, and issued two annual reports in August, 1970 and August, 1971. The Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA) was established under Reorg. Plan No. 3 of 1970, 7 C.F.R. § 2762
(1970), to execute policies of the CEQ and to coordinate and, in some cases to assume,
functions of other agencies. The Environmental Quality Improvement Act of April 3, 1970,
Pub. L. No. 91-224, 84 Stat. 91, provided the administrative staff for the CEQ. Exec. Order
No. 11514 further requires agencies to continually monitor their activities with respect to
[Vol. 47:313
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In sum, "[the Environmental Policy Act made the obligation
imposed by Scenic Hudson on the FPC... one generally applicable
to all agencies .... "12 The adoption of the operating procedures of
section 102 to be followed by all agencies was to a large extent predi-
cated on the concepts set forth in Scenic Hudson .13 Some of the most
optimistic observers hoped that NEPA "may be an effective instrument
for easing the severity of the substantial evidence - rational basis test
in environmental cases."' 4
But there were some who doubted the efficacy of NEPA because
it did not set forth specific standards for agencies to follow and for
courts to review.15 Indeed, hearings held in 1970 to determine how
NEPA was faring revealed that problems due to differing interpreta-
tions of the language of the Act were arising, that some projects were
being approved in blatant disregard of NEPA procedures and that
some agencies deliberately suppressed unfavorable information or re-
fused to change existing policies to conform to NEPA.16
But, in spite of this, NEPA was declared to be "having an effect
on agency thinking beyond what even its optimistic proponents could
have anticipated."'' 7
How greatly agency thinking has been affected by NEPA has yet
to be accurately measured, but for awhile the courts proceeded to apply
it liberally.' In fact, environmentalists met with such success in these
enhancing the environment. In 1972 the EPA issued Proposed Environmental Protection
Agency Procedures on Preparation of Environmental Impact Statements, 40 C.F.R. part
6 (1972).
12 Hanks at 267.
13 See id. and n.146.
14 Sive, Some Thoughts of an Environmental Lawyer in the Wilderness of Adminis-
trative Law, 70 CoLum. L. REv. 612, 644 (1970) [hereinafter Sive].
15 Morris, Environmental Statutes: The Need for Reviewable Standards, 2 ErqVmoN-
MENTAL .LAw 75, 76 (1971) [hereinafter Morris]. For a comparison of the explicitness and
effectiveness of environmental statutes, see id. at 79 nn.35 & 81. See also Grad, Inter-
governmental Aspects of Environmental Controls in ENVIRONMENTAL CONTROL: PmoRIrms,
POLICIs AM THE LAW 172 (1971), reviewed in Wandesforde-Smith, 1 ECOLOGY L.Q. 866
(1971); Brecher, Environmental Litigation: Strengths & Weaknesses, 1 ENviRoNMENTAL
ArrMs 565, 571 (1971) [hereinafter Brecher] and CEQ THIRD ANN UAL REPORT at 226 for
effect of Presidential action on environmental issues.
16 ADAINisTRATION OF NEPA, REPORT BY THE COMMITrEE ON MERCHANT MAINE AND
FisERmIs, H.R. RnP. No. 92-316, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971), cited in- A. REYSzE, JR.,
I ENVIRONMENTAL LAw one-112 (1971) [hereinafter RErrzE]. Only about 300 impact state-
ments per year have been submitted, in contrast to the thousands of projects and actions
initiated annually.
17 RErrzE at one-lS3. For some indications of new agency rules and procedures, see CEQ
THuR ANNUAL REPORT at 227-29.
18 In Environmental Defense Fund v. Corps of Engineers, 325 F. Supp. 749 (E.D. Ark.
1971), the court ordered compliance with the NEPA requirement for an impact statement
where the project was two-thirds complete; accord, Environmental Defense Fund v. Hardin,
325 F. Supp. 1401 (D.D.C. 1971). But see Ely v. Velde, 321 F. Supp. 1088 (D. Va. 1971);
Pennsylvania Environmental Council v. Bartlett, 315 F. Supp. 238 (M.D. Pa. 1970).
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cases that some government spokesmen and industry leaders began to
express fears that courts were going beyond legislative intent.19 As a
result of three cases in the District of Columbia Circuit,20 Congress
requested that NEPA be amended and called on CEQ21 Chairman
Russell Train to testify. But in a letter to Congress22 and at subsequent
hearings, Train indicated his satisfaction with the general approach
of the courts in their application of NEPA 23 although he said he
In Zabel v. Tabb, 296 F. Supp. 764 (M.D. Fla. 1969), rev'd, 430 F.2d 199 (5th Cir. 1970),
cert. denied, 401 US. 910 (1971), the court of appeals approved the Army's refusal, solely
on ecological grounds, to license a plan to extend a shoreline, although NEPA was enacted
after the denial of the permit.
19 Representative C. Holifield told a group of industrial executives that the purposes
of NEPA were being thwarted by "unreasonable interpretations -. . by the courts and
by agency overreaction to those interpretations." 2 (Current Developments) ENv. REP.
1396 (Mar. 17, 1972). See Like, Multi-Media Confusion, 1 ECOLOGY L.Q. 495, 507-8 (1971)
[hereinafter Like) for a history of the restrictive attitude of the Atomic Energy Commis-
sion toward NEPA, which generated adverse criticism from the press and the public,
and led the court in Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Comm., Inc. v. AEC, 449 F.2d 1109 (D.C.
Cir. 1971), to chastise the Commission's "crabbed interpretation of NEPA" and forced
it to adopt different standards. Id. at 1117.
20 Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Comm., Inc., v. AEC, 449 F.2d 1109 (D.C. Cir. 1971);
Kalur v. Resor, 385 F. Supp. 1 (D.D.C. 1971); Izaak Walton League v. Schlesinger, 337 F.
Supp. 287 (D.D.C. 1971), Kalur held that NEPA did not exempt the Army from an impact
statement and went along with the general intent of Calvert Cliffs' that although
standards set by other agencies, in this case the Federal Water Pollution Control
Agency, are to be recognized . . []bedience to [other specific environmental
mandates] is not mutually exclusive with the NEPA procedures. It does not
preclude performance of the NEPA duties.
335 F. Supp. at 14.
21 See note 11 supra.
22 In his letter, Train generally approved of the Kalur decision (see note 20 and
accompanying text supra) but disagreed with that part of the opinion holding that final
judgments as to water pollution control requirements were to be made by the Corps of
Engineers rather than the Environmental Protection Agency, the agency with specific
statutory responsibility and expertise in this area. Since it was deemed important to
centralize the responsibility for abating water pollution and since directives under the
Federal Refuse Act Permit Program would insure the same conscientious compliance with
environmental safeguards, it was felt NEPA would offer little if any additional protection.
Train also
made it quite clear the NEPA was not intended to apply to environmental
regulatory actions taken or concurred in by Federal or state agencies charged with
the mission of regulating and protecting the environment. Instead, NEPA was
intended to require agencies who have some other primary mission to consider
environmental protection where they had no previous statutory mandate to do
SO...
2 (Current Developments) ENV. REP. 1248 (Feb. 11, 1972); see note 9 and accompanying
text supra. This statement was clarified in CEQ Tan ANNUAL REPORT at 239, i.e., that
NEPA was to "supplement, but not supplant" requirements existing with other agencies.
28 The judicial role under NEPA appears to be in line with the traditional one
of ensuring that the governmental process prescribed by statute is working correctly
without attempting to second-guess agency decision as to the proper balance to
strike between environmental concerns and other national goals ... by and large
we think the courts have been doing a sound job in applying NEPA.
Testimony of CEQ Chairman Russell Train as quoted in 2 (Current Developments) ENV.
REP. 1324 (Mar. 3, 1972).
[Vol. 47:313
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would support "legislative proposals to correct problems created" by
the controversial cases.24 At any rate, worries were probably somewhat
allayed when in 1971 Scenic Hudson reached the Second Circuit again.
The following discussion will present Scenic Hudson II in con-
text with two other 1971 Term cases dealing with judicial review
under NEPA. The cases appear in reverse chronological order 2  so
that the issues may be presented in the sequence in which they would
arise in a single agency proceeding. Specifically, those issues are: neces-
sity of an impact statement; the agency's role in compiling the impact
statement; and the agency's final determination based on the impact
statement. It is hoped that presentation of the cases in this framework
will enable the reader to assess the impact of Scenic Hudson II.
Necessity of an Impact Statement
In Hanly v. Mitchell26 the Second Circuit was called upon to
determine under what conditions courts may review an administrative
agency's determination that an NEPA environmental impact statement
is not required for a particular agency action.
The General Services Administration (GSA) had planned the con-
struction of a federal courthouse annex and detention facility in lower
Manhattan and plaintiffs, residents of the surrounding neighborhood,27
had sought unsuccessfully to obtain a preliminary injunction. The
basis of the complaint was the GSA's alleged failure to comply with
the procedural requirements of NEPA by not drafting an environ-
mental impact statement.28 The Second Circuit held that GSA acted
24Id. at 1323. Part of the problem, centering on the extent of the exemption under
NEPA to agencies with previously existing statutory mandates, is being studied by EPA,
but no recommendation has been made yet. CEQ Trm ANNuAL REPORT at 240.25 Hanly v. Mitchell, 460 F.2d 640 (2d Cir.) (decided May 17, 1972); Greene County
Planning Bd. v. FPC, 455 F.2d 412 (2d Cir.) (decided Jan. 17, 1972); Scenic Hudson
Preservation Conf. v. FPC, 453 F.2d 463 (2d Cir.) (decided Oct. 22, 1971).
26 460 F.2d 640 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 41 U.S.L.W. 3247 (U.S. Nov. 6, 1972).
27 NEPA contains no provision granting standing to question the lack of an agency
impact statement and the Second Circuit did not discuss the standing issue. However
Pizitz v. Volpe, 4 E.R.C. 1195 (M.D. Ala., May 1, 1972), held that NEPA does create
a private right of action but this right is only procedural and not substantive. In
San Francisco Tomorrow v. Romney, 342 F. Supp. 77 (N.D. Calif. 1972), the lack of an
impact statement did not give a citizen's group with no pecuniary interest standing to sue
to enjoin construction of an urban renewal project.
NEPA gives citizens' groups the right to be a plaintiff only against federal agencies.
Tanner v. Armco Steel Corp., 340 F. Supp. 532 (S.D. Tex. 1972), makes it clear that NEPA
gives no private cause of action against a private corporation.
28 See text accompanying note 11 supra for the Act's provisions as to the factors that
must be discussed in an impact statement. The Act also states:
Prior to making any detailed statement, the responsible Federal official shall
consult with and obtain the comments of any Federal agency which has juris-
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in an arbitrary and capricious manner in failing to consider all rele-
vant environmental factors, and the injunction was issued.
NEPA contains a clear command to agencies of the federal gov-
ernment to consider environmental factors in evaluating proposed
actions and to disclose to other government agencies and the public
anticipated environmental consequences of such actions, as well as
possible alternatives. 29 The vehicle for such disclosure is the impact
statement required under section 102(2)(C) for "major" federal ac-
tions.s0
The entire record of GSA's consideration of the environmental
impact of the proposed project consisted of a short intra-agency
memorandum.3 ' In terse, conclusory language this document stated
that adverse effects on the environment would be minimal; that the
project would not contribute in any significant way to air and water
pollution or urban congestion nor would it threaten public health;
that utilities and trash removal would be provided for; and that there
would be no material impact upon public transportation. While this
was an adequate summary of the environmental impact of that portion
of the project devoted to the office building, it failed to even touch
diction by law or special expertise with respect to the environmental impact
involved. Copies of such statement and the comments and views of the ap-
propriate Federal, State and local agencies, which are authorized to develope and
enforce environmental standards, shall be made available to the President, the
Council on Environmental Quality and to the public .... and shall accompany
the proposal through the existing agency review processes.
42 U.S.C. § 4532(2)(c).
29 NEPA does not require that federal actions which are detrimental to the environ-
ment be abandoned but it has properly been characterized as an "environmental full
disclosure law." Environmental Defense Fund v. Corps of Engineers, 525 F. Supp. 749, 759
(E.D. Ark. 1971). The responsible federal agency must consult with other agencies which
have expertise in the environmental area, must prepare an impact statement detailing
the consequences to the environment of the contemplated action and must also propose
alternatives which would reduce the environmental damage. This statement must then
be distributed to the President, the Council on Environmental Quality, and the public.
Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Comm., Inc., v. AEC, 449 F.2d 1109 (D.C. Cir. 1971), stressed
the Act's requirement that full consideration be given to environmental factors. Id. at 1112-
14. A balancing of environmental factors versus other factors (e.g., cost) at each stage of the
deliberation process is suggested.
8042 U.S.C. § 4382(2)(C). When the challenged action does not qualify as "major",
courts will not entertain suits under NEPA. In Citizens for Reid State Park v. Laird,
356 F. Supp. 783 (D. Mo. 1972), plaintiffs sought to enjoin the Marine Corps from
carrying out a mock amphibious landing on the beaches of Reid State Park in Maine. The
court held that environmental damage from the operation would be minimal, and indi-
cated that this was not therefore a major action within the purview of NEPA. See also
Echo Park Residents Comm. v. Romney, 3 E.R.C. 1255 (C.D. Cal., May 11, 1971), upholding
the Department of Housing and Urban Development's determination that an impact
statement was not required for a proposed 66-unit apartment project in Los Angeles.
81460 F.2d at 645-46. The court held that the fact that this document was entitled
"Environmental Statement" did not estop GSA from denying the need for an impact state-
ment. Id. at 645.
[Vol. 47:313
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upon very significant effects of the jail upon the community. Plaintiffs
and the court suggested that squeezing a jail into a densely populated
area might affect the area adversely; that authentic fears of riots and
disturbances would threaten the living environment; and that noise
and traffic congestion would be greatly increased by the flow of people
and supplies to and from the jail.
The defendants contended that these were not "environmental
considerations" within the purview of NEPA. However, the court
concluded that these factors had definite bearing upon the quality of
life in an urban environment and were not excluded from consider-
ation by the language of NEPA.32 While it appeared that GSA had
not adequately considered all the environmental problems posed by
the jail, it remained uncertain whether the court could upset the
agency's determination that the project did not "significantly affect
the quality of the human environment."3 3 The court had not deter-
mined the scope of judicial review of the agency decision.
The federal defendants urged that the decision as to whether an
impact statement was required was one for the agency to make and
could be disturbed only upon a finding that it was arbitrary or
capricious or an abuse of discretion.3 4 Plaintiffs argued for a more
82 "The National Environmental Policy Act contains no exhaustive list of so-called
'environmental considerations', but without question its aims extend beyond sewage and
garbage and even beyond water and air pollution." Id. at 647. In Ely v. Velde, 451 F.2d
1130 (4th Cir. 1971), the Fourth Circuit held that the Law Enforcement Assistance Ad-
ministration was required to submit an impact statement in connection with the federally-
aided construction of a state penal facility in a scenic area. It was felt that the jail would
create an architectural clash with the scenic character of the countryside. In Goose Hollow
Foothills League v. Romney, 834 F. Supp. 877 (D. Ore. 1971), the Department of Housing
and Urban Development was held to have acted arbitrarily in failing to consider the
impact of a high-rise apartment building on a residential neighborhood, insofar as it
might change the character of the community, and the Department was enjoined from
disbursing federal funds for use on the project until a sufficient NEPA statement was
filed.
In City of New York v. United States, 337 F. Supp. 150 (E.D.N.Y. 1972), an Interstate
Commerce Commission order authorizing the abandonment of a railroad line was chal-
lenged on the grounds that allowing the abandonment would increase the use of alternate
modes of transportation, especially trucks, and would, therefore, contribute to air pollu-
tion. The court remanded the case to the Commission with directions to consider these
environmental effects and to file a supplemental report with the court in order that the
court may determine whether an impact statement need be filed.
While these cases denoted the outer limits of NEPA, it is noteworthy that courts are
accepting more imaginative suggestions of circumstances that would constitute environ-
mental impact, and are requiring, particularly in urban settings, that federal agencies pay
close scrutiny to these effects. The Hanly court declared: "The Act must be construed
to include protection of the quality of life for city residents." 460 F.2d at 647.
33 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (Supp. 1972).
34460 F.2d at 648. This language comes from section 706 of the Administrative Pro-
cedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 706 (1967), which establishes standards for judicial review of ad-
ministrative action. This was the standard applied in Citizens to Preserve Overton Park
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liberal standard of review in the environmental context, citing several
recent decisions which seemed to indicate such a trend.85 The court,
however, did not reach the issue of a relaxed standard of judicial
review, holding that GSA's failure to consider all relevant factors in
arriving at its determination was in itself arbitrary and capricious.
The court felt that consideration given to environmental factors by
the agency was inadequate even to make a threshold determination
as to the necessity for an impact statement.3 For this reason, jail con-
struction was enjoined until GSA makes a proper determination, tak-
ing account of all relevant factors, as to whether the jail will signifi-
cantly affect the quality of the human environment, and hence whether
compliance with NEPA procedures is mandatedy
v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971), and followed in Goose Hollow Foothills League v. Romney,
334 F. Supp. 877 (D. Ore. 1971), and Echo Park Residents Comm. v. Romney, 3 E.R.C. 1255
(C.D. Cal., May 11, 1971).
85 In two of the cases, Natural Resources Defense Council v. Morton, 458 F.2d 827
(D.C. Cir. 1972), and Lathan v. Volpe, 455 F.2d 1111 (9th Cir. 1971), a more liberal standard
was applied. However, the decisions dealt only with the conditions under which a pre-
liminary injunction may issue, not with the general scope of judicial review. As the court
of appeals said in Natural Resources, "[a] greater amplitude of judicial review is called
for when the appeal presents a substantial issue that the action of the trial judge was
based on a premise as to the pertinent rule of law that was erroneous." 458 F.2d at 832.
This statement referred, however, to the requirements (such as a probability of prevailing
on the merits) that generally must be met in order to obtain an injunction. The court
felt these requirements should be relaxed for critical issues of public moment.
In Natural Resources Defense Council v. Grant, 341 F. Supp. 356 (E.D.N.C. 1972) and
Scherr v. Volpe, 336 F. Supp. 886 (W.D. Wis. 1971), it was held that, while the administra-
tive agency had discretion to determine whether compliance with the statute was required,
the court itself must construe the statutory language when that determination is chal-
lenged. Nevertheless, in neither case did the court suggest a broader scope of review in
environmental cases. While the Scherr court overturned the Federal Highway Administra-
tion's ruling, it did so on the basis of the traditional standard that the agency acted in an
arbitrary and unreasonable manner in failing to prepare an impact statement.
The Second Circuit had previously put this issue to rest in Scenic Hudson Preserva-
tion Conference v. FPC (Scenic Hudson 11), 453 F.2d 463, 468 (2d Cir. 1971). In that case
it was held that where all relevant factors have been considered, and the findings are sup-
ported by substantial evidence based on that full consideration, the court will not substi-
tute its judgment for that of the responsible agency. (See notes 61-84 and accompanying
text infra for a thorough discussion of Scenic Hudson 11.) Clearly, in Hanly, the failure
of GSA to consider fully all relevant factors prompted the court to issue the injunction.
38 See City of New York v. United States, 337 F. Supp. 150 (E.D.N.Y. 1972), where a
similar perfunctory statement was rejected as inadequate to suffice as full consideration of
environmental factors. "EC]onsideration of environmental matters must be more than a
pro forma ritual." Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Comm., Inc., v. AEC, 449 F.2d 1009, 1128
(D.C. Cir. 1971).
87 In addition to Hanly, the following cases have enjoined federal agencies from con-
tinuing construction of federal projects because they did not file a NEPA impact statement:
Northside Tenants' Rights Coalition v. Volpe, 346 F. Supp. 244 (E.D. Wis. 1972)
(highway enjoined); Conservation Society of Southern Vermont v. Volpe, 343 F. Supp.
761 (D. Vt. 1972) (highway enjoined); Environmental Defense Fund v. Corps of Engineers,
331 F. Supp. 925 (D.D.C. 1971) (waterways project enjoined); Environmental Defense
Fund v. Corps of Engineers, 325 F. Supp. 749 (E.D. Ark. 1971) (dam enjoined).
[Vol. 47:313
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The Agency's Role in Compiling the Impact Statement
Once the agency determines that the requirements of NEPA are
applicable, it must then proceed to implement them. But as is so
often the case in American jurisprudence, the transformation of
Congressional language into functional reality is not without disagree-
ment as to the precise road to be followed. In Greene County Plan-
ning Board v. Federal Power Commission,38 the Second Circuit Court
of Appeals was faced with the issue of determining the duties and
responsibilities of the Federal Power Commission in relation to the
preparation of an NEPA impact statement. The court stated that the
agency has a "primary and non-delegable responsibility"39 to inde-
pendently consider environmental consequences at "every distinctive
and comprehensive stage of [its] process." 40 Thus, it held that the
failure of the agency to prepare its own detailed statement of environ-
mental impact prior to agency hearings was in violation of NEPA.41
The Power Authority of the State of New York had applied, in
August 1968, to the Federal Power Commission for authorization to
construct, operate and maintain a pumped storage power project
which would include construction of three high-power transmission
lines through rural areas of New York, generally through Greene
County and, particularly, through Durham Valley. The license was
granted by the Federal Power Commission but construction was pro-
hibited pending approval of plans for the preservation and enhance-
ment of the environment as it may be affected by the design and
location of the transmission lines.42 Motions to intervene were filed
by the Greene County Planning Board, the Town of Durham, the
Association for the Preservation of Durham Valley, the Sierra Club,
and several individuals.43
In December 1970, the Federal Power Commission required the
Power Authority of the State of New York to file a detailed statement
of projected environmental impact. This statement was filed in March
1971, at which time it was circulated among various federal agencies
having "special expertise" as required by NEPA section 102(2)(C).44
38 455 F.2d 412 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, - U.S. - (1972).
39 Id. at 420.
40 Id., citing Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Comm., Inc. v. AEC, 449 F.2d 1109, 1119 (D.C.
Cir. 1971).
41455 F.2d at 422. NEPA § 102(2)(C), 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (1970).
42 Two of the three transmission lines were approved without protest or hearing in
April, 1970, after the effective date of NEPA.
43 The Commission granted these motions on May 19, 1970.
44 The Power Authority prepared an environmental statement which the FPC cir-
19721
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In May, 1971, the Commission ordered a hearing on the proposals of
the Power Authority.
Plaintiffs subsequently moved to revoke the 1969 license and to
enjoin further construction. They also asked that the Power Authority
or, in the alternative, the Commission, be required to pay their legal
fees and expenses. It was from the ultimate denial of these motions
that the plaintiffs appealed.45
In holding that the Commission violated provisions of NEPA by
conducting hearings prior to preparing an independent statement of
environmental effect of the project, Circuit Judge Kaufman stated
that the Commission, as representative of the public interest, has a
duty to afford active and affirmative protection to the rights of the
public, and that the substitution of the Power Authority's statement
was an abdication of that responsibility.46
The court points out that section 102(2)(C) requires the agency to
integrate the technical sciences and aesthetic arts into a cohesive
system of decision-making in order to discover and pursue the course
that most effectively serves the environment.47 Therefore, the role of
culated to other federal agencies in accordance with § 102(2)(C), 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C)
(1970):
Prior to making any detailed statement, the responsible Federal official shall
consult with and obtain the comments of any Federal agency which has jurisdic-
tion by law or special expertise with respect to any environmental impact involved.
The FP0 argued that it had adopted a regulation holding the applicant's draft statement
"to be information comparable to an agency draft statement pursuant to Section 7 of the
Guidelines of the Council on Environmental Quality." 36 Fed. Reg. 22740, § 2.81(b) (Nov.
30, 1971), Federal Power Commission Order No. 415-B. Thus, the Power Authority's study
was deemed to fulfill the requirements of § 102(2)(C) and the FPC prepared no statement
of its own before holding any hearings.
45 These motions were initially denied by the Presiding Examiner of the Commission.
Notice of appeal was filed with the Commission, and they were denied sub silentio by
operation of law. Rehearings were subsequently granted by the Commission, and orders
were issued formally denying the appeals.
46 The Second Circuit has uniformly taken this position. The "act [is] designed to
require federal agencies to affirmatively develop a reviewable environmental record."
Hanly v. Mitchell, 460 F.2d 640, 647 (2d Cir. 1972).
In Scenic Hudson Preservation Conference v. FPC (Scenic Hudson 1), 354 F.2d 608 (2d
Cir. 1965) the court stated:
Mhe Commission has claimed to be the representative of the public interest.
This role does not permit it to act as an umpire blandly calling balls and strikes
for adversaries appearing before it; the right of the public must receive an affirma-
tive protection at the hands of the Commission.
Id. at 620.
In Scenic Hudson II the court held that no environmental impact statement was
necessary since the Commission's final opinion, containing its environmental findings, was
a valid substitute for the § 102(2)(C) statement. In his dissenting opinion to the Court's
denial of certiorari, Mr. Justice Douglas cites Greene County as authority for reversing
this aspect of Scenic Hudson 11. He states that "the impact statement must be written
before action is taken .... If this kind of impact statement is underated ... [it wil be] the
beginning of the demise of the mandate of NEPA." 407 U.S. 926, 931-33 (1972).
4742 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(A), (D), & (E) (1970).
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the agency is to be played as an independent party, culminating in
an objective statement as to the probable environmental effect of the
proposed project 48
The court proceeded to state three requirements for ensuring the
most efficient implementation of NEPA policies in this project. They
are: (1) that the Commission staff prepare a detailed statement before
the initial decision by the Presiding Examiner; (2) that the intervenors
be given a reasonable opportunity to comment on the statement; and
(3) that the intervenors be given the opportunity to cross-examine
both Authority and Commission witnesses in light of the statement.4
In addition, the Commission is deemed to have planning responsi-
bility and, although its immediate decision must be whether or not
to license a single project, it should consider all available and relevant
information, particularly that involving plans for future develop-
ment.50
In reaching its conclusions, the Second Circuit relied in part upon
the views expressed by the Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia in Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Committee, Inc. v. Atomic
Energy Commission.15 There the court held invalid the Atomic Energy
Commission rule dispensing with an NEPA statement if the license
application were uncontested.52 The court stressed that NEPA's primary
worth was in making the agency "itself take the initiative of consider-
ing environmental values at every distinctive and comprehensive stage
48 The court stresses the fact that the applicant's study can hardly be considered
objective. It quotes from the Power Authority's statement: "Neither the construction nor
the operation of the Gilboa-Leeds transmission line will have any significant adverse
impact on the environment." The court continues: "But, the Gilboa-Leeds line . . . will
cut a swath approximately 35 miles long and 150 feet wide across the face of Greene and
Schoharie Counties. It is small consolation that the line will not scar either existing
historical sites or designated park land." 455 F.2d at 420.
Judge Kaufman also notes that the requirement that the agency circulate its initial
report to others having "special expertise" is to ensure that there is a comprehensive anal-
ysis of the environmental factors early in the review process, prior to preparation of the
agency's final detailed statement. He also notes that independent intervenors would likely
have only limited resources in terms of money and expertise.
49 Id. at 422.
50 In this regard, the court quotes Justice Douglas' statement, writing for the Supreme
Court in Udall v. Federal Power Commission:
[Determination whether to license any one project] can be made only after an
exploration of all issues relevant to the "public interest", including future power
demand and supply, alternative sources of power, [and] the public interest in
preserving reaches of wild rivers and wilderness areas ....
Id. at 423.
51449 F.2d 1109 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
52 The court also held that the AEC could not defer to certification by other state and
federal agencies that their environmental standards were satisfied. This procedure violates
NEPA in that an agency's certification that a particular standard is met does not ensure
that the project as a whole will not be harmful to the environment.
1972]
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
of the process." 53 Calvert Cliffs' is considered the leading case on a
liberal interpretation of the National Environmental Policy Act.54
The expansive view of the agency's role with respect to the im-
pact statement, while generally a pro-environmentalist stand, can also
work against such groups, as the plaintiffs in Greene County dis-
covered. The Second Circuit disallowed plaintiffs' request for ex-
penses and fees since it had concluded that it was the Commission's
and not the intervenors' duty to prepare a comprehensive environ-
mental record. Thus, since the plaintiffs were under no duty and
there was no clear Congressional authority granting counsel fees and
expenses, they were denied. 5
With respect to retroactivity, the court joined the general trend
holding that NEPA is not to be applied retroactively to projects that
have received final approval before the effective date of its enact-
ment.56 However, despite the fact that two of the power lines involved
53Id. at 1119. As a result of Calvert Cliffs' the AEC has formulated new rules
(36 Fed. Reg. 18071 (Sept. 9, 1971)) which require the AEC to first draft its own environ-
mental statement which is then sent to other federal agendes. The agencies' comments, the
applicant's own statement plus other comments from interested parties become the basis
for the AEC's final detailed statement which is presented at the hearings.
The Second Circuit suggested that the FPC formulate new rules similar to these so as
to facilitate compliance with the spirit of NEPA "to the fullest extent possible." 455 F.2d
at 422.
Calvert Cliffs' took note of Congressional intent to predude the phrase "to the fullest
extent possible" from "[being] used by any Federal agency as a means of avoiding com-
pliance with directives set out in § 102 ... [N]o agency shall utilize an excessively narrow
construction of its existing statutory authorizations to avoid compliance." 2 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEws 2770, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969). Thus the Section 102 duties are not
inherently flexible. They must be complied with to the fullest extent, unless there is a clear
conflict of statutory authority." 449 F.2d at 1115. City of New York v. U.S., 337 F. Supp. 150
(E.D.N.Y. 1972), also holds that this phrase is meant to be broadly interpreted.
5 4 See Cohen and Warren, Judicial Recognition of the Substantive Requirements of
the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 13 B.C. INn. & COM. L. Rizv. 685, 696-97
(1972); Note, 20 KAN. L. REv. 501, 512 (1972).
55 455 F.2d at 426. The court acknowledged that intervention is a costly, lengthy
process which can be a deterrent to interested citizens. In Scenic Hudson I the court noted:
"Our experience with public actions confirms the view that the expense and vexation of
legal proceedings is not lightly undertaken." 354 F.2d 608, 617 (2d Cir. 1965). "A regulatory
commission can insure continuing confidence in its decisions only when it has used its staff
and its own expertise in a manner not possible for the uninformed and poorly financed
public." Id. at 620. Indeed, by the time of the Second Circuit's remand hearing on Scenic
Hudson, conservationists had spent nearly $250,000 on the case. Hanks, supra note 3, at
265.
The agency itself should prepare a single coherent and comprehensive environmental
analysis because "[flt is moreover, unrealistic to assume that there will always be an
intervenor with the information, energy, and money required to challenge a staff recom-
mendation which ignores environmental costs." 449 F.2d at 1118-19.5 6 See generally Note, Retroactive Application of the National Environmental Policy
Act of 1969, 22 HAsrINGs L.J. 805 (1971); Note, Retroactive Application of the National
Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 69 Mc. L. Rav. 732 (1971).
There has been some confusion regarding the retroactive application of NEPA. See
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were subject to the requirements of NEPA, the court found "no com-
pelling basis for halting construction" where the projects were 80 per-
cent complete at the time of suit.57
Despite the Second Circuit's suggestion that the FPC formulate
new rules as the Atomic Energy Commission has done,55 the FPC has
refused to do so.59 This blatant failure to comply with both NEPA
and the dictates of a federal court of appeals has not passed without
criticism.6 0 Furthermore, such an obstructionist attitude, in light of
Pennsylvania Environmental Council v. Bartlett, 454 F.2d 613 (3d Cir. 1971), and Con-
cerned Citizens v. Volpe, 459 F.2d 332 (3d Cir. 1972), holding that NEPA is not retroactive,
and Zabel v. Tabb, 430 F.2d 199, 213 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 910 (1971),
holding that it is.
The general trend seems to be that if final federal approval has been given or if con-
struction is substantially completed then NEPA will not be applied retroactively. If
further federal action or approval is necessary, however, then NEPA is applied even if con-
struction began before NEPA became effective.
The courts seem to utilize a standard of reasonableness in determining retroactivity
of the statute. In Civic Improvement Committee v. Volpe, 4 E.R.C. 1160 (W.D.N.C., Mar.
24, 1972), for example, the court considered the practical ramifications of holding for
retroactivity. The court did not enjoin construction because no impact statement was
prepared but it directed that NEPA's environmental aims be implemented during the
completion of the project.
57 The court gave three reasons for refusing to stay construction. First, plaintiffs had
not made a timely petition for review of these two lines according to § 313(b) of the
Federal Power Act, 16 U.S.C. § 8251(6). Second, the court felt that there was no "significant
potential for subversion of the substantive policies expressed in NEPA." 455 F.2d at 425.
This was found to be so since the FPC had considered alternative routings and because the
Power Authority was required to consider environmental protection in its plans. Third,
"[i]t would be unreasonable to expect instant compliance with all of the Act's procedural
requirements." Id.
The court cites Calvert Cliffs' as the basis for its holdings. However, Calvert Cliffs'
implies that if a project is subject to NEPA, then NEPA must be applied to the remaining
construction. "Although the Act's effective date may not require instant compliance, it
must at least require that NEPA procedure... be applied to consider prompt alterations
in the plans or operations of facilities approved without compliance." 449 F.2d at 1121.
See also Environmental Defense Fund v. Corps of Engineers, 325 F. Supp. 728, 746
(E.D. Ark. 1971): "Mhe degree of the completion of the work should not inhibit the objec-
tive and thorough evaluation of the environmental impact of the project as required by
NEPA ... [r]he Congress of the United States is intent upon requiring the agencies of
the United States government ... to objectively evaluate all of their projects . . . re-
gardless of the degree of completion of the work."
58 See note 53 supra.
59 The Commission has held in other certification applications that the Greene
decision is not applicable. Arkansas Louisiana Gas Company, Federal Power Commission
Opinion, No. 612, Docket No. CP70-267, Feb. 18, 1972, cited in 3 E.R.C. 1735. However,
following the Supreme Court's denial of certiorari, 409 US. - (1972), the FPC announced
that it would require impact statements to be produced by its staff for certain proposed
projects. Nonetheless, as reported by the N.Y. Times, "[ejnvironmentalists expressed doubt
that the new procedure would overnight make the five-member power commission signifi-
cantly more environmental-minded in its decision (sic)." N.Y. Times, Oct. 31, 1972, at
26, col. 3.
60 Mr. Robert Cahn, a former member of the Council on Environmental Quality has
criticized federal agencies in general for their lack of "wholehearted compliance" with
NEPA. "He said a slowness in giving adequate weight to environmental factors in deci-
sion-making persisted throughout the Federal bureaucracy, generally, but singled out the
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Scenic Hudson II, presents serious questions as to the ultimate effec-
tiveness of NEPA.
Scope of Review of the Agency's Final Determination
In 1965, when Scenic Hudson I was decided, the only source of
ecological guidelines before the court was the Federal Power Act. Con
Edison had requested and received a license from the FPC to con-
struct the largest pumped storage hydroelectric project in history at
Storm King Mountain in upstate New York. The major components
were to include a storage reservoir, a power plant and both under-
ground and overhead transmission lines. Objections were raised by
the Scenic Hudson Preservation Conference and other conservationist
groups who asserted that the project did not adequately protect fish
whose spawning ground was located nearby, and that it would do sub-
stantial permanent harm to the environment to deface the mountain
which was of unique scenic beauty and major historic significance.6'
In deciding that the "recreational purposes"'62 referred to in the Fed-
eral Power Act "undoubtedly encompasses the conservation of natural
resources, the maintenance of natural beauty, and the preservation of
historic sites," 68 the court held that the FPC had failed to compile a
record sufficient to support its decision, had ignored certain relevant
factors, and had failed to make a thorough study of possible alterna-
tives to the project.64 Furthermore, there was an "affirmative duty to
inquire into and consider all relevant facts . . . in order to make a
complete record." 65 The FPC, on remand, held extensive new hearings
Department of Transportation and the Federal Power Commission as two agencies he
considered particularly deficient . . . The Federal Power Commission, he continued, has
accorded less than full compliance to the law." N.Y. Times, Sept. 6, 1972, at 12, col. 1.
61 354 F.2d at 613.
62 Section 10(a) of the FPA, 16 U.S.C. § 803(a), states that licenses shall be issued under
the following conditions:
(a) that the project adopted . . . shall be such as in the judgment of the Com-
mission will be best adapted to a comprehensive plan for . . . utilization of
water-power development, and for other beneficial public uses, including recrea-
tional purposes ....
68 354 F.2d at 614.
64 Id. at 624-25.
65 Id. at 620 (emphasis added). Environmentalists were, if not exuberant, at least very
optimistic. The decision was viewed as an assertion of leadership by the courts in setting
new standards and priorities in the environmental decision-making process, as well as a
broadening of the traditional remedies available and rules of procedure to be followed.
Sive, supra note 14, at 631. (The author was counsel for intervenors, the Sierra Club, in
both Scenic Hudson cases). McCloskey, Preservation of America's Open Space: Proposal for
a National Land-Use Commission, 68 Mica. L. Rav. 1168 & n.5 (1970). In Udall v. FPC,
387 U.S. 428 (1967), the Supreme Court in remanding to the FPC consideration of a
hydroelectric power project to be constructed at High Mountain Sheep on the Snake
River affirmed the view that "recreational purposes" provided for in section 10(a) should be
read broadly. The remand order included instructions to consider alternatives to the
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and affirmed its earlier decision to approve Con Edison's project which
differed only in minor ways from the one originally proposed. This
time, having found that the FPC had given adequate consideration
to environmental factors as mandated by NEPA6 and section 10(a)
of the FPA, the court upheld the FPC decision. Declining to accept
plaintiffs' pleas for a broad rule of review,67 the court held that the
traditional standards of judicial review of agency actions applied and
it would not therefore reverse the FPC's determination since the
agency's findings were supported by the substantial weight of the evi-
dence. Since, here, the Commission had weighed (albeit rejected) alter-
nate plans,0 8 had considered the effect on scenic impact (and found it
minimal), had found that no historic site would be adversely affected, 69
had provided adequate protection for fish,7 and had improved the
project in some aesthetic ways, it fulfilled its mission to the court's
satisfaction.71 Holding that NEPA was applicable although passed
after the close of the FPC hearings, the court nevertheless felt that
submission of an "environmental statement" in the form of the Com-
mission's opinion met the statutory requirement. 72
Judge Oakes dissented, primarily on the factual questions pre-
sented,73 but also because he felt that the Commission had failed to
give proper treatment to NEPA's requirement of an impact state-
ment.74
Following its usual pattern in environmental cases to date, the
project and all other relevant issues including preservation of wilderness areas and
anadromous (i.e., salmon, shad) fish. Furthermore, one alternative to be given consideration
was whether there was a present need for any project at all. Id. at 486.
08 The court held NEPA applied retroactively; see note 56 supra.
07 The plaintiffs contended that such a standard was called for by Scenic Hudson I
and Zabel v. Tabb, 296 F. Supp. 764 (M.D. Fla. 1969), rev'd, 480 F.2d 199 (5th Cir. 1970),
cert. denied, 401 US. 910 (1971).
68 458 F.2d at 470.
69 Id. at 475.
70 Id. at 476-77.
71 Id. at 480. The court found compliance with the statute as well as with the remand
orders.
72 Id. at 481. Fortunately the Second Circuit seems to have retreated from this con-
stricted view in later decisions. See the discussion of Greene County Planning Bd. v. FF0
in notes 88-60 and accompanying text supra.
73 The City of New York intervened in the second proceeding before the FPC to
protest that the change in plans providing for the powerhouse to be completely under-
ground would place it near a link in the Catskill aqueduct system, one of the three
systems supplying the city with substantially all its water and that blasting during the
construction of the project might endanger the aqueduct. Judge Oakes found that several
of the agency findings lent support to the city's position and, on the whole, "fail to
convince me that there is no substantial risk to the Aqueduct." Id. at 487. He also noted
with disapproval the increased danger to New York City's already existing air pollution
problem.
74 Id. at 492.
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Supreme Court, in an 8-1 decision, declined to hear the case.7 5 The
lone dissent was by Mr. Justice Douglas, 7 a long-time proponent of the
conservation movement. He believed that the belated attempt to satisfy
NEPA was inadequate,77 that the court had wrongly presumed the
validity of Con Ed's proposal and placed on the environmentalists the
burden of overcoming this presumption,." and that the substantial
evidence test adopted by the Second Circuit should not be the only
standard adopted for review of environmental matters.
Some remedies for broadening this standard have been suggested,
one by the Supreme Court itself in Citizens to Preserve Overton Park
v. Volpe7 9 Adhering to the "arbitrary and capricious" standard for ju-
dicial review of that particular agency action, 0 it nevertheless indi-
cated that, in environmental cases, the phrase should be expanded to
apply to decisions that disregard established environmental policies.8
Another solution was suggested by Professor Jaffe,8 2 and expanded
upon by David Sive.8 3 The solution acknowledges that courts will defer
to agency opinion on factual findings, applying only the "substantial
75 407 U.S. 926 (1972). Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1970),
and Udall v. FPC, 387 U.S. 428 (1967), are two notable exceptions.
76407 U.S. 926 (1972). Mr. Justice Douglas had delivered the majority opinion in the
Udall case, as well.
771Although it has been conceded that the Act's requirements were applicable
in the proceedings, no further hearings were held; and no environmental impact
statement was drafted. The Commission approved the project and attempted to
satisfy its procedural duties under § 102 by specifying certain environmental
impact forecasts in its final opinion.
Id. at 930. The need for articulating standards has been espoused in other environmental
cases, even without reliance on NEPA. EDF v. Ruckelschaus, 439 F.2d 584 (D.C. Cir. 1971);
Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971).
78407 US. at 932. For further discussion of burden of proof in environmental litiga-
tion, see note 86 infra.
79 401 U.S. 402 (1971).
80 In Scenic Hudson I1 the Second Circuit applied the "substantial evidence" rule
because the Federal Power Act expressly establishes this as the standard of review. 16
US.C. § 8251(b).
81401 U.S. at 415-16; commented on in CEQ-SECoND ANNUAL REPORT at 168. Al-
though, in one sense, this was a broadening of judicial review standards, Professor Davis
views the Volpe decision as a limitation on judicial review because the new arbitrary and
capricious standard remains less liberal than the substantial evidence rule. The court in
Volpe said that the latter was to be applied to agency rule-making decisions only and, in
this case, where rule-making was not at issue, the only standard was the "arbitrary and
capricious" one. 401 US. at 414; K. DAvis, ADMINISTRATIVE LAw TEXT 527 (1972) [herein-
after DAvis]. Nevertheless, the argument could be made that since the Supreme Court
liberalized the arbitrary and capricious test in environmental cases, it would likewise
liberalize the substantial evidence test in those environmental cases where that test applied.
See note 80 supra. Davis comments, on the other hand, that it was in Udall that the
Supreme Court momentarily relaxed its standards, making an exception to the usual
judicial review formulae by looking into areas of agency discretion. DAvis at 529.
82 L JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL or ADMINsRATrIvE ACTION 550 (1965) [hereinafter
JAFFE], whom the Supreme Court favorably cited in Volpe, 401 U.S. at 416.
83 Sive at 624 et seq.
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evidence" test to set such findings aside, but utilizes the rule that ques-
tions of law are decided by the reviewing court independently of
agency findings. Professor Jaffe and Mr. Sive felt that, as long as
the law concerning environmental policy is in a state of development,
and the terminology of statutes remains to be interpreted, agency de-
terminations are, in effect, "law-making or law-applying" and therefore
reviewable as conclusions of law by the courts.8s
Scenic Hudson II presented two major setbacks to environmental
hopes. First, it made clear that, despite prior indications to the con-
trary, traditional rules of judicial review were not to be set aside -
strict adherence to the substantial evidence rule was still in effect.
Secondly, although NEPA was applied retroactively, NEPA's proce-
dural requirements seemed to be met with considerably less than a
formal impact statement, and there were no clear standards as to how
much weight confficting economic and environmental factors were to
be given.
Conclusion
Many debate the role the courts should play in the development
of environmental law.85 But the normal judicial process poses a heavy
burden on the environmentalist as far as burden of proof, 6 obtaining
expert witnesses, 7 conducting discovery proceedings,88 and, the major
84JArF at 550; Sive at 625.
85 Chief Justice Burger has warned federal courts not "to exercise (their) equitable
powers loosely or casually whenever a claim of 'environmental damage' is asserted."
168 N.Y.L.J. 14, July 21, 1972, at 3, col. 5. He stresses the difficult task of balancing that is
required of courts during this transitional period when "new environmental legislation
must be carefully meshed with more traditional patterns of federal regulation." Id. at
col. 5-6.
For a discussion of powers and limitations of courts as opposed to the legislature
compare Jaffe, Book Review, ENVIRONMENTAL. PRoTECTION 652 (1971) with Brecher, Morris
S. Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resource Law: Effective Judicial Interven-
tion, 68 MICH. L. REV. 473, 560 (1970) and Jackson, Foreword: Environmental Quality, The
Courts, and the Congress, 68 MICH. L. REv. 1073 (1970) [hereinafter Jackson]. Senator
Jackson was the principal sponsor of NEPA in the Senate.
86 It has been argued that the NEPA intends the contrary (cf. ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY
- THE SECOND ANNUAL REPORT OF THE COUNCIL ON ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY 161 (1971)),
but, if so, agencies have "too often forgotten that an applicant always has the burden of
proving that his proposed actions will be in the public interest." Hanks at 268. See also
Brecher, supra note 15; Sive, Securing, Examining, and Cross-Examining Expert Witnesses
in Environmental Cases, 68 MicH. L. REv. 1175, 1186-87 (1970). Along with the burden of
proof is the problem of "proving" aesthetic values, analyzing "scenic beauty" and measur-
ing and balancing natural wonders against economic and technological considerations. Id.
at 1191.
87 See id. at 1189-91; Brecher at 569; Sive, supra note 14, at 619.
88 Courts may be impatient with lengthy discovery proceedings when a temporary
injunction is preventing the start of a multi-million dollar project. See Brecher at 568.
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obstacle of all, meeting the heavy costs of litigation.89 At the very least
the court offers a forum for publicity and for arousing public senti-
ment.9 0 At best, the courts offer conservationists the assurance that
agencies are living up to the spirit as well as the letter of legislative
policy.91 Some hope the courts will do even more. As has been noted,
it is urged that the burden on environmentalists be eased by expand-
ing the bases for judicial review.92 Many urge that the question of
environmental "rights"93 will give the courts an opportunity for more
active intervention in the future. Perhaps the courts should assume a
powerful role temporarily until judicial decisions in environmental
law have developed enough to provide agencies a framework for
forming sound decisions on their own.94
But the Second Circuit in Scenic Hudson II clearly has not as-
sumed such a role. Whether or not other circuits follow this passive
approach, there are strong indications that NEPA is forcing positive
action toward the protection of the environment. According to the
Council on Environmental Quality NEPA has noticeably influenced
the federal government in several areas. First, in establishing environ-
mental protection as a national goal, it has broadened agency horizons
and brought bureaucratic thinking in line with the growing senti-
ments of the national community. It also has provided a systematic
way of dealing with environmental problems which often cut across
agency lines. By opening governmental action in this area to public
scrutiny it has assured that agencies articulate their decisions satis-
89 See note 55 supra.
90 "Public participation plays a vital role.., by sounding an alert when an agency
has failed to consider important environmental effects." CEQ THIRD ANNUAL RE-PORT at 247.
See also CEQ THiRD ANNUAL REPORT at 256. The court forum also offers environmentalists
a rare chance to cross-examine polluters. Brecher at 566; cf. Like, supra note 19, at 495.
91 See Morris, supra note 15, at 82; accord, Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v.
Ruckelshaus, 439 F.2d 584, 597 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
92 See text accompanying notes 82-84 supra.
93 For example, Senator Nelson (D. Wis.) has proposed an amendment to the U.S.
Constitution providing that "every person has the inalienable right to a decent environ-
ment," 116 CONG. REc. 580 (daily ed. Jan. 19, 1970), as cited in Hanks at 268. There has
been controversy over the change by the House Conferees from the Senate-passed wording
of the original NEPA bill which read "each person has a fundamental and inalienable
right to a healthful environment" to "[t]he Congress recognizes" that each person "should
enjoy a healthful environment" (as section 101(c) now reads). H.R. REP. No. 91-765, 91st
Cong., 1st Sess. 8 (1969). Whether or not this was a deliberate attempt to stop short of
expressly creating a personal "right" to a clean environment has been debated. See Grad,
supra note 15, at 173. See also RErrzE at one-ll3. The asserted right to a decent en-
vironment has been presented as both a personal and a property right, and as a private
as well as public right. See Grad at 173; Sive at 642 & n.170. Compare Hanks at 251 with
Note, Toward a Constitutionally Protected Environment, 56 VA. L. Rrv. 458 (1970).
94 See 439 F.2d at 598; text accompanying note 83 supra.
[Vol. 47:313
SECOND CIRCUIT NOTE
factorily 5 and, by allowing citizen groups to enforce NEPA mandates
by suing in the federal courts, it has helped to insure agency adher-
ence to these mandates. As a further promise for the future, agencies
have been augmenting their staffs with personnel experienced in en-
vironmental matters so that more sympathetic viewpoints may be ex-
pected. Effects on other areas of governmental decision-making are
claimed but are incapable of precise measurement. 96
But such accomplishments should not lull the courts into assum-
ing "the position of an umpire blandly calling balls and strikes."97
Congress has begun the job of establishing national goals by setting
forth its legislative intent in NEPA. It is the obligation of the judiciary
to insure that agencies do not subvert that intent. Hopefully, Scenic
Hudson 11 will, in time, become nothing more than an anomaly in the
"environmental awakening"98 and the fears of Justice Douglas that this
decision marks "the beginning of the demise.., of NEPA '9 9 will prove
unjustified.
95 CEQ Thm ANNUAL REPORT at 255. This trend to demand adequate explanation of
agency findings has also been noted by K. Davis, who cited Environmental Defense Fund
v. Ruckelshaus, 459 F.2d 584 (D.C. Cir. 1971). "[W]e cannot assume, in the absence of
adequate explanation, that proper standards are implicit in every exercise of administra-
tive discretion." DAVIs at 333. The Ruckelshaus opinion noted:
We stand on the threshold of a new era in the history of the long and fruitful
collaboration of administrative agencies and reviewing courts. For many years,
courts have treated administrative policy decisions with great deference, confining
judicial attention primarily to matters of procedure. On matters of substance,
the courts regularly upheld agency action, with a nod in the direction of the
'substantial evidence' test, and a bow to the mysteries of administrative expertise.
Courts occasionally asserted, but less often exercised, the power to set aside agency
action on the ground that an impermissible factor had entered into the decision,
or a crucial factor had not been considered. Gradually, however, that power has
come into more frequent use, and with it, the requirement that administrators
articulate the factors on which they base their decision. Strict adherence to that
requirement is especially important now that the character of administrative liti-
gation is changing. As a result of expanding doctrines of standing and review-
ability, and new statutory causes of action, courts are increasingly asked to review
administrative action that touches on fundamental personal interests in life,
health, and liberty. These interests have always had a special claim to judicial
protection, in comparison with the economic interests at stake in a rate-making
or licensing proceeding.
439 F.2d at 597.
The Supreme Court has indicated approval of this belief by its decision in Volpe. It
refused to allow a district court to rely blindly on the Secretary's discretion without a
full record before it, although it declared that no formal findings by the Secretary were
required. The court even added that it might be necessary to interrogate the decision-
makers themselves if the bare record did not give an adequate basis for review. 401 U.S. at
419.
96 CEQ - Tsmua ANNUAL RxEour at 255-57.
97 354 F.2d at 620.
98 The President's Message on the Environment, Feb. 8, 1972, reprinted in CEQ-
TRmD ANNuAL REPORT at S65.
99 407 U.S. at 926.
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